Abstract
Populism is a vague concept and the word is used almost exclusively in a negative context. Nevertheless, for more than 50 years, a rather rich literature has tackled the subject.
The stumbling block has most often been the ambiguity of the term populism. Is it an ideology or a movement? Also, as populism has mostly been defined by delimitation, by its critics rather than by its followers, this has created a wider spectrum of signification. This illegitimate birth entails a limited conceptual autonomy: populism needs to be compared to something else in order to be identified a contrario. Also, populism has often been considered a disease of representative democracy, not a doctrine in its own right.
This has not always been the case. Populism is the iron mask of democracy, the supplanted twin. Populism does have a legitimate history: people used to proudly call themselves populists and defended their political vision.
The concept of populism has been drawing the attention of social scientists for exactly half a century. The first academic symposium dedicated to populism was held on May 19-21 at the London School of Economics and its works were subsequently published in 1969 (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969) .
But in order to trace the academic history of populism, one needs to follow its political history.
Populism and democracy share their roots. Populism and the nation-state were born at the same moment in history: the end of the 18 th century which brought about the French Revolution. Representative democracy won over populism as the political regime of the newborn nation-state. The people is the new sovereign, only it does not rule directly but via elected representatives. The transition was operated during the Estates-General in 1789, when the Third Estate breaks away and establishes itself as National Assembly instead of People's Assembly: the people vanishes, the nation supersedes it. The second half of the 19 th century sees it resurface in Russia and the US, with the narodniki and the American populists.
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The narodniki were left-wing intellectuals opposed to the reforms meant to westernize Russia. Their doctrine blended socialism and tradition, and the role of the intellectuals was to enlighten the peasants. Strongly anti-capitalist, they dreamt of a new society built upon the model of the traditional Russian rural community, with its collective ownership of the lands.
The movement was active between 1850 and 1880, and in 1876 the party Zemlia i Volia (Land and Freedom) was founded. Internal disputes led to a split. The radical terrorist wing disintegrated after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1881).
In the US, the impulse of the populist movement did not come from the elite, but from the farmers themselves. The Farmers' Alliance, set up in 1876, was the reaction of Southern and Western farmers to the agricultural crisis of the mid 1870's. Facing low prices and mounting debts, under pressure from banks and railroads, they lobbied the federal government for regulation. As the Republican and Democrat parties were reluctant to the farmers' requests, in 1891, the People's Party, widely known also as the Populist Party, was created. Its goal was to defend the interests of the small farmer against the financial and industrial elite. As such, it advocated for the dismantling of national banks, a graduated income tax, direct election of US senators and Government control of all railroads, telegraphs and telephones.
At the 1892 presidential election, the People's Party candidate carries four states. The populists are also the first American party to accept women members. Four years later, the party decided after a lively convention to support the losing Democrat candidate. In 1900 In , 1904 In and 1908 , the party runs the presidential race. Governors, senators and congressmen were elected under its banner before the party collapsed. Nevertheless, the populist left their mark on the American political history by their appeal to increase the federal power in order to turn it into "the people's government". If their beliefs were often related to socialism, they
were not socialists in their vision of private property as principle of economy. One of the key factors contributing to the transformation of Southern farmers' discontent into political populism was their engagement in the co-operative movement (Canovan, 1981, p. 54 
What populist parties in the EU?
In order to assess if there is or not a populist momentum in the EU, one needs to identify which are the populist parties referred to. The definition we have designed shall provide instrumental, as elements of populist discourse have been integrated in the political messages of parties across the political spectrum. We consider that, in order to be relevant, populist movements have to be or have been represented in Parliament over the last five years. As some countries do not have a proportional electoral system, one has to allow for parties with a significant share of voter support but little or no MPs, so we set an alternative significance threshold at 5% of the votes cast in a national election. there is no populist movement in the country. In Greece, Golden Dawn has sometimes been called populist: we envisage it as a far-right movement. In Cyprus, the Citizens' Alliance (SYPOL) is also regarded at times as populist: we deem it a radical left party. The KotlebaPeople's Party Our Slovakia does not qualify in our view to be considered right-wing populist, as there is solid ground to place it to the extreme right. Nine EU countries momentarily lack a successful populist actor: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia.
The ideological diversity of the selected parties is extreme, ranging from the far left (SYRIZA, Die Linke) to the far right (AfD, Jobbik), corroborating the idea that populism is neither right nor left. As compared to our definition, all these parties rally the people against distant elites, most often the European Union, but also the national establishment perceived as alienated from the people's needs and aspirations (FN, AfD, M5S, Unidos Podemos, UKIP). For the most left-leaning, these corrupt elites represent the capitalist system (Die Linke, SYRIZA). Some of them, as current (SYRIZA, PiS, Smer-SD, Fidesz) or former (FPÖ) ruling parties, and even as junior coalition partners (SNS, United Patriots), cannot fully play the anti-establishment card, so they resort to the unifying populist rhetoric.
Unifying populism serves politicians trying to transcend cleavages, to pose as connectors. To do so, they make use of a semantic ambiguity of the term people, which can signify altogether the people as nation (dêmos), the ethnical people (ethnos) or ordinary people. Thus they can appeal to the people to seek unity for a wide range of purposes, the only constant being that the foreseen unity is made against something: the other politicians and parties if the intended audience is the people of citizens, the civic nation (dêmos); the foreigners, be they from outside the country or from within (minorities) if they address the ethnic people When Orbán Viktor developed the concept of illiberal democracy, it was in fact a populist democracy that he was advocating for. A democracy where supranational elites cannot sway national policies; where checks and balances are limited and the government has a strong say in economy; where the people achieves self-government and the political agenda is regulated by instruments of direct democracy (referenda). As a role-model populist, the Hungarian prime minister was disputing the theory of elitarian democracy to be defended against the people unable to grasp its level of complexity as a political system, famously elaborated by Lipset (1960) .
The EU is the ideal scapegoat for populist parties, but they do not have the monopoly Podemos being the most conspicuous and consistent in this practice). This tactic is all the more effective as the party is certain not to be able to take office, but some of these parties eventually did, which led in the aftermath to a more cautious approach (SYRIZA, Smer-SD).
UKIP's and Leave campaign's pledge to redirect £350 million per week from UK's net contribution to the EU budget towards the British National Health Service was one of the most powerful arguments for the Brexit vote in the 2016 referendum. Upon victory, nobody backed this promise anymore, as it turned out the figure was grossly inaccurate. In the ensuing national elections in June 2017, the UKIP crashed at 1.8%, down from 12.6% in the 2013 legislative polls and 27.5% in the 2014 EP elections. new home and as a result they are being targeted by the recriminations of Western populist parties: they take the jobs of the natives, work for lower wages, increase criminality. In these conditions, can populist parties from Western Europe co-operate with their Eastern counterparts? Do the voters of populist parties have a similar profile, or even is there a resemblance between the followers of all populisms in history, is there a generic people of populism who would be the cornerstone of this sociopolitical construct?
EU populist parties' results in the 2014 European Parliament elections and last national elections
We shall strive to answer in the first place the last question, as it is the most general. When it comes to the anti-immigration stance, Eastern populists are as radical as the Western ones. They echo their national public opinion, with 11 out of the 15 most hostile countries to immigration from outside the EU hailing from the former communist bloc, ranging from a record 83% of negative opinions in Latvia to Romania's 59% (Eurobarometer In conclusion, there is no divide between Eastern and Western European populism, only minor contextual differences.
Is there a populist momentum in the EU?
In the final part of this paper, the time has come to answer the initial question: can we In Central and Eastern Europe, populism has become mainstream and in some countries, like Slovakia, populist parties have dominated the political stage in the long run.
As a conclusion, if there is now a populist momentum in the EU, it is mostly a consequence of the enlargements to the East. The different political culture in some of these countries has brought the populists to the table. And they are here to stay. Civilizaçao Brasileira.
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